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siege of Detroit, are properly omitted as belonging to a more northern scene. The appearance of John Lind as messenger from Farmar to Governor Kerlérec is oddly suggestive.

Anyone who cares for this portion of the history of our common country will find this book readable and instructive; to the writer of history it is a source-book which cannot be overlooked.

The editorial work is up to the high standard set in the previous volumes. The translations are well done, though there are a few slips which might be corrected. For instance, on page 165, *songer à diminuer* is given as "consider the restriction"; *considéré* (p. 201) means a person of importance, who might be a "beloved man", as the word is here translated, though there are many instances where a *considéré* was feared and hated by his people. In English usage the word was supplanted by the noun brave. The word transliterated disgrace, on page 512, means ill fortune.

Notour (p. 154) is a good Scots word which needed no "ious" appended to it; nor should conform (p. 148) have been followed by a disfiguring *sic*. There is a good index, and the book is well printed.

American Diplomacy. By CARL RUSSELL FISH, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin. [American Historical Series, edited by Charles H. Haskins, Professor of History, Harvard University.] (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1915. Pp. xi, 541.)

THAT an authoritative text-book upon the history of American diplomacy was much needed anyone who has had to conduct under-graduate classes in the subject will bear witness. But two books have been available and neither was written with the class-room primarily in view. Each is the effort of a trained diplomatist and expert in international law. The arrangement of one upon a strictly topical basis makes it difficult to use where there is no assurance, as there usually is not, of a sufficient background of American political history on the part of the class. The other is sketchy, lacking in balance, and, while pleasantly written, omits many important episodes and includes others not of a diplomatic character; it is the work of an authority in diplomacy, of an amateur in history writing. The present volume, designed to be "comprehensive and balanced", suffers from another sort of limitations. It is the product of one trained in the teaching and writing of American history. As a narrative it carries the reader along with continuous interest. As a whole it is what it asserts itself to be, "a condensation of ascertained conclusions". It suffers from an overloading of incident and episode, so that it is not always easy to follow the various stages of what may be called the larger factors of American foreign policy. Such is apt to be the case when the chronological method is so closely followed as it is in the present volume. To

illustrate: the northwestern boundary controversy has certain fairly well-marked stages from 1792 to 1846. The various factors entering into the American position appeared for the most part successively. One finds "the first link in the chain of claims which was to bring Oregon to the United States" upon page 93, the second upon page 148, the third upon page 186, the fourth upon 195, the fifth upon 202, and the sixth upon 214, each so ticketed, to be sure, but with much matter intervening upon quite different topics. The really significant factor in the development of an American policy, namely the linking of the northwestern boundary question with our coast claims, is, however, not considered. In another connection the author departs from his usual chronological arrangement with an equally infelicitous result. Discussion of the northeastern boundary dispute is deferred until the Webster-Ashburton negotiation is reached. The reasons for the dispute grew out of the peace negotiations and might better have been indicated in that part of the narrative, as it was largely because of the ignorance of geographical conditions in 1782 that a line so potential of dispute was adopted. Where a specific foreign policy is determined by successive episodes Professor Fish is at his best. Thus the period from 1793 to 1815 (where the political history and the diplomatic history run in the same channel) and that of the Civil War are among the most satisfactory portions of the book. The part since 1898 is the least deserving of commendation, especially in those pages wherein reference is made to the problems of international law raised by the Great War. That we "ignored our international relations" from 1829 to 1898 (p. 4) is hardly substantiated by the space (little less than 200 pages out of 500) which is properly given to those seventy years.

Accuracy of statement is indeed the prime desideratum of a textbook. It is to be regretted that one finds, in this, so many careless statements, some of which are doubtless due to hasty proof-reading, the latter a matter which the reviewer might perhaps have overlooked, since all dwell in glass houses. But no mention of the line of Alexander VI. is to be found in the treaty of Tordesillas (p. 11), and to say that the treaty-line was "somewhat to the west" of the former one is unnecessarily vague. Nor was the treaty of Saint Germain the first after Tordesillas to refer to America (p. 13). While commissioners were appointed under the treaty of Utrecht to draw a boundary for the Hudson Bay country (p. 16), it would have dispelled uncertainty and an incorrect tradition to have added that these commissioners never agreed upon a line. Evidence that the Revolutionary diplomatists conceived of international arbitration as a "natural expedient" (p. 22) is certainly not quite obvious. That the draft of the treaty of amity with France, 1778, was largely the work of John Adams was worth noting, considering that the United States frequently used the same ideas, similarly phrased, in later treaties (p. 29). It is surely not quite correct to say (p. 43) that Vergennes incited Holland to enter

the war in December, 1780, or that Gardoqui limited Spain's claim to the Yazoo (p. 70). "The failure to give the government full control of aliens within the limits of the states" (p. 80) is not generally regarded as a constitutional limitation, but one that might be cured by Congressional action, as recommended by several Presidents. The British commissioners at Ghent have not usually been characterized as "well-chosen" or "representative", or indeed as "expert and skilful" (p. 180). In discussing the non-colonization clause of the Monroe Doctrine no mention is made of the important instruction of Adams to Middleton, July 22, 1823. Canning's position would have been made clearer had it been stated that Rush was not informed of France's disinclination to join against Spanish America (p. 213). More than three lines might with propriety have been given to the mission of Edmund Roberts, and Cushing's contribution to the doctrine of extra-territoriality certainly deserves mention, as does the work of Townsend Harris. Madison's proclamation of 1815 was not strictly one of neutrality (p. 207), and elsewhere there is an apparent confusion between executive proclamations requiring observance of the neutrality acts with proclamations of neutrality. During the Civil War the doctrine of continuous voyage was not "confined to the carrying of contraband" (p. 308), as recent controversy well attests. The statement that "the question of transfer of ownership [of merchant-vessels] in time of war has been regulated since 1910 by the Declaration of London, at least in the case of nations signing that declaration, of which the United States is one" (p. 312, n.), is not verified by recent events.

The author's discussion of the Panama episode is strangely twisted. Speaking of the Hay-Herran treaty he says: "after four months' debate [it] . . . was rejected by the Colombian senate in July, 1903" (p. 439). The Colombian congress met June 20 and the senate acted August 12. Proceeding, he says, President Roosevelt "ordered our minister to leave Bogotá and prepared a message proposing to Congress that we begin to dig the canal. He argued, or at least asserted, that Colombia, in rejecting a reasonable and generous offer, had violated the treaty of 1846. . . . An agreement, he believed, might be made with Panama" (p. 440). The Colombian government handed Minister Beaupré his passports November 14, 1903. If Mr. Roosevelt's draft is meant, this was prepared before October 31, when the Colombian congress adjourned and the possibility of ratification ended. In that draft the President was to recommend the purchase of the French company's claims. The argument referred to appears in the messages of the following December and January, after Panama had seceded, had been recognized, and had entered into a treaty with us. This treaty was signed November 18 and not December 7 (p. 442). However much the Panama affair may be justified because of "such unparalleled importance as to exempt it from the ordinary laws of morality and of nations" (p. 443), to suggest that Jefferson justified the pur-

chase of Louisiana upon similar grounds hardly does justice to the former negotiation. The Central American Court of Justice is at Cartago, and not at San José, Costa Rica (p. 451). Pan-American conferences have not been held every five years since 1901, nor was the last at "Santiago of Chili in 1911" (p. 451). The English colony of Dominica frequently appears where Santo Domingo is meant (p. 327 thrice, 330, 349) and the Tasmanian island of Bruni for the Bornean sultanate of Brunei (p. 286). Misprints of dates are too frequent for such a work: Gray's entrance into the Columbia was May 11, 1792, and not in 1791 (pp. 93 and 148); the treaty of 1842 and not that of 1846 regulated the navigation of the St. John's (p. 346); the mediation between Haiti and Santo Domingo was in 1911 and not in 1851 (p. 384) and the Payne-Aldrich Act was passed in 1909 (p. 470). To let "satisfactorially" (p. 466) and a "statute of Frederick the Great" (p. 467) pass into print may strike a responsive chord in the undergraduate's heart if it does not clear his mind.

There are a number of maps, some colored, some inserted in the text. The former are generally good. That showing the growth of the consular service might have given way to one adequately delineating the territorial acquisitions. The one illustrating the development of the diplomatic service is useful, but some of the dates need revision. The inset maps suffer from the faults of their class. They are not clear, particularly when boundary lines are sought to be shown.

Many of the errors pointed out can easily be corrected in a later edition, but that a clear conception of the development of American foreign policies can be secured by the narrative and chronological method is not demonstrated by the volume offered.

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The Fighting Cheyennes. By GEORGE BIRD GRINNELL. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. viii, 431.)

OF some twenty wild tribes formerly ranging the great Plains from Canada to the Mexican border, one of the most important, owing chiefly to their central position adjoining the overland trails, was that of the Cheyenne, or as they call themselves *Dzitsistas*, nearly equivalent to "kinsmen". Formerly of eastern Minnesota, they drifted across the Missouri; and for eighty years past have lived in two divisions, widely separated but keeping up a friendly intercourse, *viz.*, the northern, ranging chiefly along the North Platte in company with the Sioux and Northern Arapaho, and now gathered upon a reservation in Montana, and the southern, much the larger division, ranging south from the Arkansas, in company with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Southern Arapaho, and now residing with them in western Oklahoma. The whole tribe at its best may have numbered 3500 souls or perhaps 800 warriors. The latest census gives 1420 for the northern and 1860 for the southern division.